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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD ENTER AN ORDER APPROVING THE STIPULATION 
OF APRIL 16, 1990, AND DISMISSING THE APPEAL. 
The appellees advance the argument that a settlement agree-
ment reached by the parties to this appeal on April 16, 1990, moots 
the appeal. (Brief of Appellees, pp. 12-13.) The appellants agree 
that the parties reached a settlement agreement on April 16, 1990, 
a copy of which appears in the Addendum to Appellees' brief. 
Appellants also agree that this settlement agreement renders the 
appeal moot under Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Pursuant to Rule 37, this suggestion of mootness is presented to 
the Court with a request that the Court accept and approve the 
settlement and direct the clerk to enter an order of dismissal of 
the appeal. 
Appellants do not believe that it is just that they receive 
less than the $5,800,000.00 awarded as attorney fees by the 
December 6, 1988 Order of the trial court, together with all 
interest accrued thereon. Appellants believe that the results 
achieved, $44,000,000.00 for their clients, were beyond anyone's 
predictions. Nonetheless, the settlement agreement, which repre-
sents significant concessions by appellants, was reached as a 
result of long and arduous negotiation and appellants feel a moral 
and ethical commitment to be bound by the terms thereof. 
Accordingly, the appellants join appellees in urging that the 
Court approve the settlement agreement and dismiss the appeal. 
POINT II 
THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE APPLIES TO THIS CASE. 
Appellees argue that the law of the case doctrine does not 
apply to findings of fact, but only to conclusions of law. (Brief 
of Appellees, p, 9, n. 3.) Appellants agree that the classic 
definition of the doctrine has usually been expressed in terms of 
a legal decision at one stage of litigation binding future legal 
decisions in successive stages of the same litigation. The policy 
considerations behind this doctrine, however, apply with equal 
force to the Mfactual" determination made by the trial court. 
Where the trial court made factual findings in the December 5, 
1988, Memorandum Decision, based solely on the record before it and 
2 
its own observations, and where no new evidence was presented 
thereafter to the contrary, it was error for the trial court to 
make different findings in the October 31, 1989, Memorandum 
Decision. Moreover, as appellees apparently agree, the trial court 
entered its conclusions of law in the December 5, 1988, Memorandum 
Decision, to the effect that reasonable and fair attorneys fees 
under the circumstances were $5,800,000.00, and it was error for 
the trial court to reverse its own legal decision in the subsequent 
October 31, 1989, Memorandum Decision. 
Appellees also argue that the law of the case doctrine does 
not limit the power of the trial court to reconsider its inter-
locutory decisions. (Brief of Appellees, p. 9, n. 3.) Appellants 
cannot agree with this proposition. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
applied the law of the case doctrine to review of interlocutory 
orders. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 
42, 44-45 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Nothing changed in this case between December 5, 1988, and 
October 31, 1989, which would justify the trial court in changing 
its findings, conclusions and decision. Indeed, the only new 
evidence presented to the trial court after its original decision 
either supported the original fees or an increase in the fees not 
a reduction. (See, e.g., Affidavit of Sol Schreiber, attached 
hereto in the Addendum and hereby incorporated herein. Mr. 
Schreiber is a highly regarded, nationally prominent expert in the 
awarding of fees to class counsel in class actions, who has served 
as a Special Master in more proceedings than any other, including 
3 
In Re: Agent Orange. See also the proffer of Thomas T. Anderson, 
attached hereto in the Addendum and hereby incorporated herein. 
Mr. Anderson is a nationally known trial lawyer with extensive 
experience in class actions and contingent fee cases.) The trial 
court erred in reconsidering and modifying its decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The settlement agreement reached by the parties should be 
approved by this Court and the clerk should be directed to enter 
an Order of dismissal of the appeal. Alternatively, the Memorandum 
Decision of October 31, 1989, should be vacated, and the Memorandum 
Decision and Order of December 5 and December 6, 1988, should be 
reinstated. 
DATED this /CJ - day of May, 1990. 
JACKSON HOWARD and 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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APPENDIX "A" 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF FEE AWARDED 
TO PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL 
(SOL SCHREIBER) 
SOL SCHREIBER 
Milberg Weiss Bershdd 
Specthrie & Lerach 
One Pennsylvania Plaza 
New York, New York 10 119 
(212) 594-5300 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICJ COURT IN AMIJ FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF IT AH 
DOLLY PLUMB, et al . , 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
STATE OF UTAH, et al . , 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
FEE AWARDED TO PLAINTIFFS 
COUNSEL 
Case No C3? 4879 
Judge David S. Young 
SOL SCHREIBER, being duly sworn says 
I am an attorney licensed to practice in the courts of 
the State of New York. Attached to this affidavit is my 
curriculum vitae. 
The counsel for the depositors in this action have 
asked me to review and render an opinion on the compensation 
awarded to them following their settlement with the State of 
Utah last year. They have also asked that I render an opinion 
on the methodology used by James U. Jensen, who is the Master 
appointed in this case, to review costs incurred by class 
counsel and Depositors of Insured Thrifts (DOIT), the 
non-profit corporation organized for the benefit of the Utah 
depositors in this action. 
To accomplish th.s task I have reviewed a series of 
documents and other materials, including 
1. Motion for Preliminary and rin^I Appioval of 
Attorneys Foes and Costs 
2. Supplemental Memoiandum in Supp-:t of Attorneys 
Fees for Class COUHLPI, 
3. Memoranda [Jec'/^ on jf Decnnb^r C , 198M • 
4. Order of December 'v 1^ 88 
5. First Interim Rupert 
6. Order ~)t December 16. 1988 
7. Third Interim Rpport. 
After consideration of what I heWP of>&n and reviewed, 
and based on my experience as Master in a scries of significant 
cases (listed in the attached curriculum vitae), as a former 
judicial officer (U.S. Magistrate, S.D.N.Y. 1971-78), as 
professor of law ;n complex litigation (ForUhatv. University 
School of Law, 1972-86), and a teacher in the area of complex 
litiqation and class actions in continuing legal education 
circles for more than twenty years, it is my considered opinion 
that: 
1. The fee awarded to class counsel in this case of 
$5,800,000 is reasonable one, whether considered on a common 
fund basis, a lodestar approach, or a hybrid of the two. It is 
also significant that the fee falls at the minimum expressed in 
the 1987 fee agreement between class counsel and DOIT. The fee 
agreement was in itself, in my opinion, a reasonable and 
careful effort to set forth parameters for compensating class 
counsel, subject to approval of the court, ind it should be 
given considerable weight. 
2. On a common fund basis, the fee .warded was 20% 
of $29,000,000. I understand class counsel voluntarily agreed 
not to seek a fee on the additional $15,000,000 recovered from 
the St Ate of Utah. In my experience a for* of 20°* in common 
fund cases is a reasonable one in light of the quality of work, 
the expertise required, the result obtained, and the other 
factors that illustrate the work that class counsel did for the 
depositors in this class action. Put another way, the opinion 
of the Master that one-third of the original tee award should 
be strucK is completely meritless. It only stands to reason 
that counsel must be compensated reasonably and consistent with 
the job they have done. In my judgment, the Master does not 
begin with that approach. It appears the Master simply labels 
himself an advocate for putting as much money in the 
depositors' pockets as possible, disregarding the depositors' 
duty to pay a fair fee and costs associated with counsels' 
efforts in this litigation. The depositors are not well served 
by undercutting their counsel and service providers, either on 
a basis of simple equity or in looking forward to their further 
need for counsel and service providers in this action. The 
Master's approach is at best a short-sighted policy. The 
depositors recognize it as suchf since they have filed their 
own papers, prepared by t:he*r own special counsel, attacking 
the Master for paternal 53m m an effort tc avoid their opinions. 
3. On a lodestar basis, the fee re class counsel is 
quite reasonable. When the time spent oy counsel implementing 
the settlement with the State is conoider* ; in addition to 
their earlier time, 1 understand that the multiplier here would 
be less than 3.00 to yield a fee of $5,300,000, which again is 
very reasonable, f^te depositors depend oi\ class counsel under 
the Thrift Settlement Legislation of 1988 to cany on with 
their effort to recover the balance of principal and interest 
due to the depositors. Thin requires collaboration with the 
State and California Union Insurance Company. I believe this 
cannot be accomplished without, satisfying the reasonable 
obligations of the depositors to their counsel and to the 
service providers they depend on to prepare their case. Simply 
to cut fees and costs is, in my opinion, a fundamental error 
and counterproductive. 
4, In accord with Rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which is substantially identical to the federal 
rule, one should look to the court's orders of reference to 
determine the breadth of the Master's appointment. In the 
December 5, 1988 Memorandum Decision, the December 6, 1988, and 
the December 16, 1988 Order, the Master's scope of authority is 
limited to an examination of the propriety and accuracy of 
amounts claimed for costs incurred by various consultants and 
expeit witnesses m connectl^r w-th -ne t^ass action and a 
ieport to the court on tne Ma£t**L - tmcmvjs m tnat regard. 
do not believe the fotegoinj Meant *r/Jui* Decision and Orders 
permit the Master to examine ih^ issue of attorneys fees for 
class counsel. Indeed, the coiiV hnr icz ied its decision and 
final otdei on tne matter r,f attorneys ffes. It seems clear., 
therefore, that thete is no n^ed, a-d th^ rourr had no intent, 
to refer the matter of attorneys tees ^o the Master s 
attention. It is my considered opinion M'ar in reviewing 
attorney's fees foi class counsel the Master has addressed 
matters clearly outside th* scope of nt? Rule 53 appointment, 
thus, it is respectfully submitted that tne recommendation of 
the Master on attorneys fees for class counsel should thus oe 
disregarded by the court, 
5. With respect to the costs of prosecuting an 
important class action. 1 believe that the Master is misguided 
in his approach to the standards to be followed in reviewing 
costs, It is obvious that when a class action is over, one can 
minimize costs expended by class counsel Experts are 
sometimes retained who prove in the last analysis to have been 
of limited value; or depositions may be taken that ultimately 
are never used; accountants may be hired to review the work of 
other auditors and find that thuy mubt tLdce many blind alleys 
before they discover the route to the result they need. The 
examples could be multiplied many times. Using only hindsight, 
and not an analysis ot trie ^ iiuatiu;; that faced counsel at the 
time, the Master appears to lw/'-;< critiaed and LP:used to permit 
the depositors to v^Y '^ctny or the costs of tl en. highly 
successful suit againsr the* Sta*e. It is more than a little 
ironic thar class counsel, whose extraordinary success produced 
an early settlement from the State, find themselves criticized 
as though their efforts and the effoits of the service 
providers had instead produced a minimal or unsatisfactory 
outcome. With the extraordinary success in this case, which, I 
understand, the Court has more than once referred to as a 
"miracle", one would think that the Master would he equally 
complimentary of their effort. Instead, one can read the 
Master's report from one end to the other, only to find that he 
has filtered from the tcports every basis on which the Court 
itself praised the work of counsel to an extraordinary extent, 
As an example of the Master'5 errors in this regard is 
the manner in which he dealt with the costs of hiring Mr, Todd 
Conover and his firm, Edgar, Dunn & Conover. Mr. Conover was 
Comptroller of the Currency in the Reagan administration in the 
early 1980's. As such, he was a member of the board of the 
FDIC. I am advised that he participated in some of the largest 
bank insolvency proceedings in the history of the United 
States. He was eminently qualified to assist class counsel in 
explaining to the Utah Attorney General's office, members of 
the Utah Legislature, and the Governor and his staff 
of the vagarjes and ultimately tatal weaKnesses of the Utah 
Private Deposit insurance System. H<=> appears to have done a 
reasonably good job, because it is my understanding that the 
Governor and Utah Legislature were sufficiently moved, by the 
depositors' e-jrly efforts, to appoint a Task Force to study the 
matter and to encourage the Governor to enter intu immediate 
efforts leading to the ultimate settlement of the case. While 
one may be able to criticize an hour here or an hour there 
spent by Mr. Conover , or oy class counsel in dealing with him, 
it is not possible in the uncertainty of a developing class 
action to be a* efficient as one would like. The reasonable 
basis for judgment is to count results. In my opinion, class 
counsel did an extraordinary job in focusing at a very early 
date the willingness of the State of Utah to settle this case 
on its merits. I have not seen in the expenditures that they 
recommend to the depositors any sign or motivation of spending 
excess funds. On the contrary, I understand they counseled 
with DOIT many times to economize on expenditures and to make 
DOIT's money stretch to cover all of their needs. 
A Master under Rule 53 is not an advocate for one 
side. He serves, in my judgment., in a judicial capacity -
fully charged as any judge to be even-handed. In this case, it 
appears that, the Master has apparently failed to follow such a 
standard. Furthermore, it Is my understanding that the Master 
in gathering evidence failed to follow the appropriate 
procedures called for by Rule 53 He nas held no hearings even 
after the matter has been brought to his attention, 1 have 
also been advised that the Master will not hold a scheduled 
hearing on Friday, July 7, despite all the objections to his 
prior failure to hold formal hearings, and that he expects 
instead to take only informal, oral, or written statements, 
Tn summary, at :s my opinion that from the date of his 
appointment, the Master went substantially beyond his 
appointment to review requested reimbursement costs, did not 
proceed with the proper even-handed 'judicial spirit, improperly 
considered himself to be the advocate for a cause, ignored the 
wishes of the very depositors he claimed to represent, and 
reached a flawed and incorrect result. 
Dated: July 6, 1989 
Subscribed and Sworn 
My Commission Expires: 
Nov, 30, 1991 
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BLOQRAWtlCAL SKETCH - SOL SChREIB-.. 
SOL SCHREIBER received a Bachelor of Arts aegree. cum 
Uude ttorr City College of New Ymk in 1952, and an LL.B from 
Yale Lav School in 1955 Since February 1982. he has been a 
•artner in the law firm of tflibera Weiss Bershad Specthne & 
Lerach He is admitted to the bar of the State of New York, to 
the United States District Court for the Southern and Eastern 
Districts of New York and to the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals. Mr Schreiber is a member of thp American Bar 
Association, the New York State Bar Association, and 
Association of the Bar of the City of Now York and has been 
elected to the American Law Institute. 
In July 1985 Mr Schreiber received the Fcar.cis Rawle 
Award, from the American Law Institute/American Bar 
Association s Committee on Continuing Professional Education, 
for his outstanding achievements in post-admission legal 
education. 
In November, 1984, Mr. Schreiber received the Legal 
Aid Society s Presidential Award. 
From 1971 through 1978, Mr. Schreiber served as a 
United States Magistrate in the United states District Court 
for the Southern District of New York where he conducted 
thousands of civil and criminal hearings and supervised 
pretrial procedures in many complex civil actions involving 
derivative, class, securities, accounting, antitrust, aviation, 
professional malpractice and products liabilty, including 
Berkey v. Kodak, Litton v, ATT, the Penn Central Commercial 
Paper Litigation, the ~Argo Merchant-Nantucket Stranding, and 
the Tenerife 747 Collision "cases. 
in March, 1974, upon appointment by the Chief Justice 
of the United States, he served as a Judicial Member, 
Anglo-American Exchange on Civil Procedure. 
Mr Schreiber has served, and is presently serving, as 
court-appointed Special Master in a series of complex federal 
cases, including the Agent Orange Litigation (J. Pratt & 
J. Wemstein, E.D.N.Y. 1982 -1984); the sex discrimination suit 
against the City University of New York (J. Gagliardi, S.D.N.Y. 
1984 • ); the Brooklyn Immigration Detention Center 
(J. Nickerson, E.D.N.Y. pro-bono, 1982-1984); The New York 
Times sex discrimination settlement (J. Wyatt, S.D.N.Y. 
pro-bono, 1978-1983); the MacMillan Publishing Co. sex 
discrimination suit (J. Lasker. S.D.N.Y. 1985 - ); a 
cable-TV contract case - St. Charles Cable T.v. v. Eagle 
Comtronics (J. McMahon, S.D.N.Y. 1984-87); a libel case -
Fleischer v. Fantagraphics (J. Broderick, S.D.N.Y. 1984-86); 
and an insurance coverage-attorney fee matter Yonkers Board of 
Education v. CNA & Continental Casualty Co. (C.J. Brieant, 
S.D.N.Y. 1987). Most recent Special Master assignments ave 
included an international antitrust case (J. Rachey, D.D.C. 
1986-1988; Hunt-short sale silver class action cases 
"and panelist or. Piob. .\s and Techniques m Civ: lico cases at 
the Federal Judicial Center s woiitshop for Judges of the Second 
and Tnird Circuits - Saratoga Springs, New York He nas also 
didressed the Ninth Circuit Judges Workshop in January, 1987, 
on Summary Judgment, Expert Testimony and Complex Litigation, 
and the Federal Judicial Center seiminars for U S Magistrates 
en Discovery Trends & Abuses' - June, July * Auqust, 1989. 
From November 1978 to February 1982, Mr Schreiber was 
President and Chief Executive Officer of a unit of the 
Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York wnich provided 
centralized legal, risk management and insurance services for 
the Federation's hospitals, homes for the aged, and health, 
education and community service agencies. 
From 1955 to 1971 Mr. Schreiber was associated with 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company as trial counsel in the 
federal and state courts in New York City He was Resident 
Counsel of their Brooklyn legal office from 1966-1971. 
In the Fall, 1979, Mr. Schreiber served as the Hearing 
Officer for the New York State Energy Master Planning and 
Long-Range Electrical & Gas Planning. 
An adjunct professor at Fordham Law School from 1972 -
1987, Mr. Schreiber conducted spring seminars on products 
liability, occupational disease and liability insurance 
litigation and trial advocacy, 
Mr. Schreiber has been a participant in numerous 
special project committees for the American Bar Association and 
the Second Circuit, including service as the Reporter for the 
ASA Advocacy Task Force, which led to the formation of the 
National Institute for Trial Advocacy (1970-1971), 
From 1973 to the present Mr. Schreiber has been the 
planning and program chairman of the ALW-.BA Continuing 
Professional Education national courses of study on federal 
evidence, civil practice and litigation in federal and state 
courts and has been a frequent lecturer at professional 
programs and workshops on fedetal civil procedure, trial 
evidence, product liability, occupational disease and liability 
insurance, Mr. Schreiber has edited and co-edited more than 40 
workk m these areas, 
Additional and mote detailed publications, bar 
association activities, and CLE program^ include: 
1. During his services as Special Master in the 
Agent Orange litigation, a number of Mr, Schreiber's written 
reports and recommendations, approved by the Court were 
officially published in: 96 F.R.D. 578; 532; 582-587; 587-593, 
97 F.R.D. 424-427; 427-439, 98 F.R.D. 522-539; 539-548; 
558-56G, and 99 F.R.D. 338-339; 645-650 
2 Pr(^_e^^._onal_Actj.vit les 
.j6;_iq75 ABA Judicial Administration Division, Member. 
1967-1975, Asst Secretary 1972-1975 
;-)6?~i973 Committee on Trial Practice and technique 
for the Second Circuit, Member 1967-1973. 
Secretary l9t>7-i97u 
1930 1982 Member, Comm;rrees on Healtn Care and Civil 
Practice ard Procedure of the ABA Antitrust 
Section 
1970-1978 Joint InterprofcGSion-ii Committee of Doctors 
and Lawyers of the First Department, New 
York. Member 1970-1978, Chairman 1975-1978 
1964-1971 Member, A.A,A. National Panel of Arbitration 
1965 to Association of the Bar of the City of New 
present York 
Chairman, Medicine and Law Committee, 
1965-1969 
Chairman. Special Committee on Human 
Experimentation, 1968-1970 
Member, Federal Courts Committee, 1976-1979 
Member, Committees on Products Liability 
(1979-1986), science and Law (1985 - 1987) 
1973-1977 planning staff, United States Magistrates' 
Seminar Programs at the Federal Judicial 
Center 
1980- Co-Chairperson. Legal Aid Society's Continuing 
Education Seminars on Complex civil Litigation 
1980-1982 Co-Chairman, New York State Bar Assn's. 
Multi-Site Seminar on New York and Federal Rules 
of Evidence and State Class Actions 
1985-1987 Chairperson, Federal Asbestos Leqislation 
Committee of the ABA Section of Tort & Insurance 
Practice 
Member, N,Y.State Bar - Association of the Bar of 
the City of New York - Joint Task fcorce on 
Liability Insurance Coverage 
3. Cp n 11 n: i i :i^  Leg a I Educational Pi oqraav 
I960 to Developed and participated in tne noiiowxng 
sieseiit education workshops and proqramb *mder tne 
sponsorship of various organizations including 
the Practising Law Institute and the American Law 
Institute-American 9ar Association Committee on 
Continuing Professional Education * 
Trial Evidence 
Courtroom Techniques 
Federal Civil Practlre and Litigation 
Federal Criminal Practice and Procedure 
Commercial and Corporate Litigation Problems 
Class Actions under New Federal Rule 23 
Products Liability 
Medical and Professional Malpractice 
Liability Insurance Litigation 
Liability, Damages, and Medicine in Tort Cases 
Current Problems in Federal Civil Practice 
Practice under the NPW Fedeial RUIPS of Evidence 
Civil Practice b Litigation in the Federal Courts 
Hospital Liability 
Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation 
Medical Products Liability and Preventive Law 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 
Employment Discrimination and Civil Rights 
Actions in Federal Courts 
4. Publications 
Developed and edited or co-edited the following works; 
Civil Practice ft Litigation in the Federal Courts, 
AH/AHA Continuing Legal Education course study 
materials (4th EdL • 3 vol., 2700 pp., August 1936). 
employment Discrimination and Civil Rights Actions in 
Federal Courts (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials (3d. 
Ed. June 1987; approx, 635 pp.) 
Recent Developments in Section 198? Civil Rights 
Litigation, PLI Handbook (1984, 655 pp.) 
Trial Evidence & Techniques in Federal & State Courts 
- A Clinical study of Recent Developments, ALI-ABA, 
CLE Course Study Materials (revised for each of 30 
programs, latest ed. October 1987, 660 pp.) 
Suppl - , *27 l ) . HLi-hon «. ur-v. , 
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APPENDIX "B" 
PROFFER 
(THOMAS T. ANDERSON) 
PROFFER: 
Comes now counsel for depositors and submits the following as a proffer of 
proof. If Mr. Thomas T. Anderson were called as a witness for the petitioners, he 
would testify as follows: 
1. That the attached is his Curriculum Vitae and that it is true and 
correct. 
2. That he has represented many plaintiffs and has secured may verdicts 
and settlements in excess of $1,000,000, and is familiar with the factors that are used 
to determine a reasonable fee in contingent fee cases. 
3. Based on the hypothetical question asked, it is his opinion that a 
reasonable fee would be $11 million or 25% of $44 million. At the outside 25% of $29 
million would be $7.25 million and that would be reasonable if there is to be an 
additional recovery of fees from other sources or other defendants. 
4. In his opinion, $5.8 million or 20% of $29 million is inadequate, but from 
the standpoint of everyone but the lawyers could not be considered unreasonable. 
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THOMAS T. ANDERSON 
Curriculum Vitae 
Member, The Inner Circle of Advocates, 1985-present, 
Limited to top 100 personal injury* attorneys in the 
United States. 
Member, International Academy of Trial Lawyers, 1989-
present. 
Selected by "Town & Country Magazine," June 1985, as 1 
of 84 Best General Trial Lawyers in America. 
Selected in the 1989 edition of "The Best Lawyers in 
America" the best personal injury attorney in Riverside 
County, California* This conclusion based upon a survey 
of lawyers who were asked to select the best lawyers in 
their county. 
President, California Trial Lawyers Association, 
1970-1971. 
Judicial Council, State of California, 1978 and 1979. 
Vice President, California Trial Lawyers Association, 
1966-1969. 
Member, Board of Governors, Association of Trial Lawyers 
of America, 1971-1977. 
Executive Committee, Association of Trial Lawyers of 
America, 1973-1976. 
Co-author, Association of Trial Lawyers of America Basic 
Advocacy Manual, 1968. 
Member, Board of Governors, California Trial Lawyers 
Association, 1968-1977„ 
President, Desert Bar Association, 1963-64 and 1964-65. 
Member, Board of Trustees, Desert Bar Association, 
1957-1968 
Member, Board of Governors, Western Trial Lawyers 
Association, 1964-1970. 
Trustee, Attorneys Congressional Campaign Trust, 1975-
1978. 
Member of California Bar Association, Association of 
Trial Lawyers of America, California Trial Lawyers 
Association, Western Trial Lawyers Association, Desert 
Bar Association, and International Society of 
Barristers, Trial Lawyers for Public Justice (TLPJ), 
National Board of Trial Advocacy. 
Public office, Board of Trustees, Palm Springs BOYS1 
Club, 1973-1978, and Board of Trustees, Palm Valley 
School, 1962-1977. 
Accepted Jesus Christ as personal saviour on September 
5, 1976. Since that date has been a member of the Board 
of Trustees, Youth for Christ; Board of Governors, 
Institute for Creation Research; Board of Trustees, 
Ariel Ministries; Board of Directors, Julian Center; co-
counsel and Assistant Attorney General for the State of 
Louisiana in Keith v. Board of Educationf wherein 
declaration is being sought for the constitutionality 
and enforcement of a statute requiring teaching of 
Creation Science if Evolution Science is taught in the 
public schools of Louisiana; lectured to various groups, 
including attorneys, on the subject matter of the 
evidence supporting the deity of Christ. 
Education: B.B.A. degree, University of Oregon, 1949; 
B#S. degree, Willamette University, Salem, Oregon; 
two years of Law School at Willamette University; and 
received L.L.B. degree from University of San Francisco, 
1955. 
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HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION 
Mr. Anderson: 
I intend to ask your opinion as to what would be a fair fee for plaintiff's 
counsel in this pending case. As a basis for your opinion, I want you to assume the 
following facts to be true. 
1. For many years prior to July of 1986, the State of Utah had a privately 
insured thrift & loan industry. The industry consisted of depository institutions 
chartered as industrial loan corporations, commonly known as thrift & loan companies 
or "thrifts." Deposits in the thrift & loan companies were to be guaranteed to a 
statutory limit of 515,000.00 per account by a legislatively created private guarantee 
corporation. The guarantee corporation, however, was grossly undercapitalized from its 
inception. Healthy thrifts fled to the safety of FDIC or FSLIC coverage. Five less 
healthy thrifts could not qualify for federal deposit insurance and remained with the 
guarantee corporation which I will designate by its acronym ILGC. 
2. I want you to assume that in 1985 and 1986, these five thrift institu-
tions were in grave financial difficulty and their impaired condition was known to state 
officials and to the state commissioner of financial institutions. The state was working 
toward finding a solution for the problems. During that time that the State of Utah 
knew that the ILGC (Industrial Loan Guarantee Corporation) was insolvent and unable 
to guarantee the deposits, but nevertheless, failed to tell the depositors of that 
circumstance on the theory that it could find an equitable solution that would be more 
advantageous to the depositors than allowing the ILGC and the thrift institutions 
themselves to fail 
3. Not finding a satisfactory solution such as a take-over or buy-out, the 
State of Utah, on July 31, 1986, closed said thrift institutions and put ILGC into 
receivership at which time the losses to the depositors were estimated to be in the 
neighborhood of 5106,000,000 principal. Of the 5106,000,000, at that time it was 
estimated that 531,000,000 could be recovered by fast liquidation, that 541,000,000 was 
liquid, and that there would be about a 544,000,000 shortfall. 
4. The 5106,000,000 in lost deposits represented «KHw~*^ately 17,000 
accounts held by approximately 9,000 depositors. Certain depositors formed a commit-
tee to act on behalf of all depositors to seek redress from the State of Utah and its 
Department of Financial Institutions. When those efforts failed, the committee chose 
to seek redress in a court of law on behalf of the depositor class. The depositor 
(committee conducted nationwide interviews to find counsel to represent the class. The committee finally chose class counsel from over 50 firms. The firms selected were 
Misuraca, Beyers, Costin, Case & Provencher and Haley & Stolebarger. The principal 
lawyers involved were Malcolm Misuraca and Doug Provencher of Misuraca, Beyers, 
Costin, Case & Provencher and George Haley of Haley & Stolebarger. 
^ m | 0 The depositor committee, as representative of the class, and class 
counsel signed a written contingent fee agreement prior to commencement of the 
action. The contingent fee agreement provided that class counsel should be awarded a 
fee of between 20 and 40 percent of amounts recovered. The depositor committees 
insisted the case be taken on a contingent fee basis or not at all. 
6. In response to an invitation from the committee, approximately 80% of 
the class members (100% of the class members responding) expressly authorized class 
counsel to present claims on their behalf and ratified the engagement of class counsel 
on a contingent fee basis. 
7. To bring the case class counsel was first required to successfully achieve 
a declaratory judgment on the following issues: 
a. Whether notices of claims under the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act could be filed on behalf of a class of persons rather than individually. This was 
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an issue of first impression in the State of Utah with a split of authority in surround-
ing states. 
b. Whether the limitations date barring claims under the Utah 
Governmental Act could be extended on equitable grounds.* The grounds were the State 
of Utah's misleading assurances that the State would satisfy the claims in spite of the 
claimant's non-compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act. In fact, the State's 
true intentions came to light the time in which to bring the claims had run. 
8. After successfully litigation those procedural hurdles, class counsel filed 
a comprehensive complaint for damages and other relief. The complaint named 60 
defendants and 300 Doe defendants specified in the complaint by category. Included 
among the named defendants were the State of Utah, the Department of Financial 
Institutions and its past and present officers, a prestigious Salt Lake City law firm, 
other thrift & loan institutions, and representatives of thrift & loan institutions who 
had served as trustees of the failed guarantee company which was to have guaranteed 
thrift deposits. The thrift & loan institutions and their representatives named as 
defendants consisted of a significant portion of power and wealth in the State of Utah. 
The complaint included the following claims: 
a. Common law deceit or fraud; 
b. Other species of fraud; 
c. Statutory fraud such as fraudulent conveyances; 
d. Per se liability for the breach of criminal statutes including the 
felony of receiving deposits into an insolvent financial institution; 
e. Breach of duty; 
f. Violations of securities laws; 
g. Constitutional violations; 
h. Breach of express, implied and constructive contracts; 
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i. Negligence; 
j. Other torts; 
k. Civil conspiracy; 
1. Violations of the federal Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act; and 
m. Violations of the Utah Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 
Enterprise Act and its successor the Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act. 
9. The named defendants hired the prestigious big name counsel in Utah to 
defend them. They responded with a barrage of motions to dismiss, motions for a 
more definite statement and motions to strike. Class counsel performed extensive 
discovery, formal and otherwise, and extensive research to establish the liability of the 
State and the other defendants. Oral argument on the motions lasted an entire day. 
The court took the motions under advisement and the motions were still pending when 
settlement was later reached. 
10. Class counsel also sought a legislative solution at the same time they 
were prosecuting the civil action. Class counsel attempted to recover the depositors' 
lost saving through means of legislation before the Utah Legislature which would have 
created a new bank with State backing comprised of the remaining assets of the failed 
thrifts. The legislative measure required extensive research and negotiation. The 
measure failed to pass in the general session, but that effort led to the enactment of 
legislation creating a task force to examine the failed thrift crisis and to evaluate 
whether or not the State of Utah was liable to the depositors. 
11. Class counsel appeared before the task force and revealed for the first 
time damaging evidence against the State of Utah. At the request of the task force's 
counsel, class counsel briefed a number of issues including: 
a* the State's liability to the depositors; 
4 
b. the State's insurance coverage for its liability to the depositors; 
c. the inapplicability of a 515,000 per account statutory limitation 
on deposit guarantees claimed as a defense by the State, and 
d. claims against defendants other than the State of Utah. 
12. Class counsel then negotiated over a period of several months a 
settlement with the Governor of the State of Utah and the State's insurer which 
provided a recovery to the class of approximately S44 million. Once approved by the 
Governor the settlement had to be enacted by enabling legislation in special session by 
the Utah Legislature which had already refused to provide relief to the thrift deposi-
tors in the general session. The Legislature finally passed the settlement bill after a 
month of negotiation with class counsel and four meetings of the special session. Once 
approved by the Utah legislature the settlement had to be approved by the class action 
court in which the class action was pending. Once approved by the court the settle-
ment had to be approved by a majority of the class on individual notice to each class 
member. 
13. Of the settlement funds, $15 million of the $44 million settlement is a 
nonrecourse, interest free advance from the State of Utah to the depositors on the 
proceeds of future liquidation of the thrift assets. The proceeds of future liquidation, 
if any, will be divided between the depositors and the State until the advance is 
repaid. Although class counsels' contingent fee contract allowed for a fee on the 
entire $44 million recovery, class counsel sought no fee with respect to the $15 million 
advance from the State. Class counsel claimed a fee only with respect to the $29 
million portion. 
14. Of the $29 million, the State contributed $10 million and the State's 
insurers contributed $19 million. The State's own counsel had advised the State it had 
at most only $1 million in coverage. Class counsel was able to convince the State and 
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its insurers of the State's extensive risk in spite of its limited coverage, which 
ultimately resulted in the State's insurers tendering S19 million toward settlement. 
15. The time spent by class counsel up to the time of the settlement, if 
charged at their normal hourly rates, would yield a charge of approximately $1.8 
million. Class counsel have additionally spent thousands of hours implementing the 
settlement. 
16. Class counsel is in the process of filing a new amended complaint 
against remaining defendants including four Big Eight accounting firms, several smaller 
accounting firms, officers and directors of the failed thrifts, and the law firm previ-
ously named as a defendant. A new survey of the class revealed that 94.4% of the 
class desires class counsel to proceed to prosecute the remaining claims. The class 
committee and representative plaintiffs recognize the importance of maintaining a 
professional relationship with class counsel and the importance of preserving the 
contractual rights and obligations under the contingency fee agreement to insure that 
the case will continue against the remaining defendants on the agreed upon terms. 
Accordingly, they have repeatedly stated orally and in writing that class counsel should 
receive a reasonable fee from the settlement proceeds and that the contingent fee 
agreement should be honored. 
17. Costs of approximately $1.0 million were incurred, approximately $800,000 
of which was for expert fees. A large portion of class counsel's out-of-pocket 
expenses were paid as incurred by the class. A balance of approximately $650,000 of 
the costs remains unpaid and for which class counsel is obligated. 
18. The class consists of approximately 9,000 persons, holding approximately 
17,000 accounts in the failed thrifts. 
19. The court made a preliminary ruling that it would authorize a fee of 
$5.8 million or 20% of the $29 million recovery. There appears to be no significant or 
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meaningful dissatisfaction by the depositors 'to that amount. No one has raised a 
protest or entered an objection-
Based on the above facts which I have asked you to assume, do you have an 
opinion regarding what would be a reasonable fee for counsel representing the 
depositors? 
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